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Does the EU Need a Navel? Implicit and Explicit 
Identification with the European Union 
Abstract 
Analysts should expect neither too much from European Union identity and its causal 
role in driving the integration process, nor too little, by underestimating the stabilising force 
of implicit identification with the EU. Daily transactions in an EU institutional context embed 
an acceptance of the EU as a legitimate political authority and underpin passive consent to 
the continued functioning of the EU.  The emergence of explicit EU identification is 
contingent upon the value (real and symbolic) attached to transactions, the extent to which 
valued goods are perceived to be under threat and whether competing political authorities are 
viewed as legitimate. 
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1. Introduction: 
There has been a recent rise in scholarly interest in the role played by identity in the 
European integration process.
2
 The nature of EU identity and its relationship with European 
integration needs further unpacking and conceptual refinement.  One source of insight into 
the relationship between identity and territorial integration and disintegration comes from the 
extensive literature on national identity and community formation.
3
  The nature of identity 
                                                             
1 This paper has been accepted for publication in the Journal of Common Market Studies (accepted Feb 2011). 
Thanks to participants at the various conferences and workshops at which earlier versions of this paper were 
presented for helpful critiques: particularly to participants in the Arena seminar and at the ECPR Porto 
conference. Thanks to James Mitchell for extensive comments on various drafts and to the two anonymous 
referees for constructive comments. This research is part of the ESRC-funded  project RES-000-22-4348 
„Implicit Triggers, Identity(ies) and Attitudes to the European Union: An Experimental Approach.  
2 See, for example: Bruter (2003, 2005); Carey (2002); Diez Medrano and Guttierez (2001); Herrmann, Risse 
and Brewer (2004); Checkel and Katzenstein (eds) (2009); Citrin and Sides (2004); Gerard Delanty (1995); 
Fligstein (2008); Fossum (2003); Green (2007); Habermas (1992, 2006); Hooghe and Marks  (2008); Laffan 
(1996); McLaren (2006); Risse (2003, 2004, 2005 and  2010); and Shore (2000). 
 
3 Scholars need not become preoccupied with the question of whether or not the EU is, or will ever be, a 
national state in order to utilise the insights and approaches developed by students of nationalism and national 
identity. Unification nationalism, involving the „unification of a number of nominally sovereign states‟ 
(Breuilly, 1982: 65-89) (as occurred, for example, in Germany and Italy), for example, is particularly 
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and its role in relation to the support for and maintenance of political regimes has been the 
subject of longstanding scholarly debate. Gellner (1997:90), for example, in his blunt 
question „Do nations have navels?‟ referred to the tension between „primordialists‟, who saw 
national identity as a historically determined given and the „modernists‟ who saw national 
identity as a creation in response to modern social requirements and conditions. Identity, 
from this latter perspective, was not a precondition for the emergence of political regimes (in 
this case national states) but was used to support the development and maintenance of such 
regimes. Gellner (1997, 101) concluded that: „Some nations have navels, some achieve 
navels, some have navels thrust upon them. Those possessed of genuine ones are probably in 
the minority, but it matters little‟. Drawing on this national identity and community formation 
literature, and building on previous contributions on „Banal Europeanism‟4 (Cram, 2001, 
2009a and 2009b), it is argued that: 
(i)             a conceptual distinction must be made between identification as, 
identification with and support for the European Union – the relationship between 
these categories needs to be problematised not assumed; 
(ii) both implicit and explicit aspects of identity must be taken into account – 
in particular, the importance of implicit identification in creating a latent political 
community in the EU needs to be recognised; 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
appropriate as a model for examining the European Union. Although these studies of states and nations refer to 
an earlier, predemocratic era, there is still much to learn from students of these phenomena. 
4 This article builds upon the concept of banal Europeanism originally published in a number of publications as 
part of the ESRC „One Europe or Several‟ programme (Cram, 2001a and b) and subsequently developed in 
Cram 2009a and b. There is now a growing literature which recognises the importance of the hot or heroic v 
banal distinction in relation to the study of European Union identity and the emergence of a political community 
at EU level. See, for example: Cram, 2001a, 2001b, 2009a and 2009b; Trenz 2004; Priban 2009; Castiglione 
2009; McNamara (2010). 
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(iii) the mobilisation of explicit or conscious identification with the EU, in 
the latent political community, becomes possible as the EU emerges as a positive 
„meaningful presence‟ for the citizens of the EU and as the legitimacy of existing 
political authorities comes into question. 
Even, however, if a surge in conscious identification with the EU takes place and the 
EU, in Gellner‟s (1997) terminology, discovers its „navel‟, identity is contingent and 
contextual. A more meaningful measure of the relationship between EU identity and 
European integration, it is argued, is the extent to which implicit or unconscious 
identification with the EU exists and has become sufficiently embedded to underpin ongoing 
public consent to the functioning of the EU as a system. 
 
2. Unpacking Identity and its Effects: 
Defining identity and isolating its effects is notoriously difficult (see for example, 
Abdelal et al, 2009). To understand the role played by identity in the European integration 
process it is essential to distinguish between three key categories: (i) the self-allocated label 
or role (identification as) ie. I am European; (ii) the state of being (identification with) ie. I 
am more or less intensively attached to the EU and/or its outputs; and (iii) the political 
behaviour (support for) – I am a supporter of the EU, its policies and/or European integration. 
It is, moreover, important to move beyond the dominant focus on identification as Europeans 
and to problematise and explore the relationship between, identification as a European, 
identification with the European Union and support for (or opposition to) the European 
Union.  
The act of self-categorisation (identification as) reveals who or what an individual 
sees herself as. However, it tells nothing about the meaning or intensity of that categorisation 
to the individual. As Citrin and Sears (2009:147) put it, „one can  call oneself an American 
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without feeling strongly patriotic or believing that nationality is fundamental to one‟s self-
concept‟. 
Empirical research on EU identity has been driven largely by the available data. It 
has, therefore, focused predominantly on the extent to which individuals identify themselves 
as Europeans or on attitudinal research which identifies the extent to which individuals 
express support for the EU and the integration process. Further research has sought to 
identify the characteristics of those who identify themselves as Europeans (Fligstein, 2008) 
and how this might relate to future support for European integration. To this end survey data, 
such as that produced by Euro-barometer, have been a key source. This approach has been 
heavily criticised for failing to capture what identification as a European means to survey 
participants (Bruter, 2003) and for over-stating the relationship between support for European 
integration and identification as a European (Cram, 2009).  The UK and Ireland provide good 
examples of the disjuncture between stated support for the EU and identification as 
Europeans. These two member states represent extreme ends of the support for scale of  the 
EU. For example, the Euro-Barometer survey No 61
5
 asks respondents if they (i) have a 
positive image of the EU, (ii) benefit from EU membership, or (iii) support EU membership. 
UK responses to these questions are consistently in the bottom two of the member states. 
Irish responses are consistently in the top three most positive. However, when asked whether 
they identify as more or less European, Irish and UK respondents are both below the EU 
average of European identifiers. Also both have high levels of respondents who identify 
themselves as „nationality only‟. There is no straightforward relationship between support for 
the EU and identification as a European or vice versa. 
                                                             
5 Eurobarometer No 61, 2004 is most commonly used as it asked the question concerning the extent to which 
respondents view themselves as European.  
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The concept of identification with the EU should not be confused with support for the 
regime or its policies. The distinction between these categories is perhaps best illustrated by 
example. It is conceivable that a Euro-sceptic who, in Easton‟s (1965) terms, exhibits neither 
diffuse (toleration of the regime) nor specific (for particular EU policies) support for the EU, 
and does not identify herself as a European
6
, may in fact identify with, or be attached to, the 
EU. The mechanisms through which this implicit identification emerges are explored in the 
following section. In Section Four, the conditions under with implicit identification with the 
EU becomes manifest are explored.  
This example highlights the importance of measuring not only identification as or 
support for but identification with the EU. It also highlights the importance of understanding 
the process through which implicit or unconscious attachment to the EU may be transformed 
into explicit, conscious identification with the EU. Even if the attachment of the individual to 
the EU were to become explicit, and even if this individual were to begin to support the EU at 
either a diffuse or specific level, there is no certainty that she would also begin to label 
herself as a European in a survey.  
 
3. The Nature and Embeddedness of EU Identity:  
 (i) EU Identity as Contingent and Contextual: 
Renan (1990: 19) famously wrote in 1882 that the very existence of a nation is a 
„daily plebiscite‟. National identity, in this view, is less a romanticized notion of emotional 
attachment to a homeland or culture than a choice or act of will, even a calculated decision 
concerning the costs and benefits of affiliation. In similar vein, Deutsch et al. (1957: 85) 
argued that „political habits of loyalty‟ could be shifted from any given political unit to any 
other, whether larger or smaller, „if this seemed to offer a more promising framework within 
                                                             
6 Although it is entirely possible that a Euro-sceptic might identify themselves as European but be anti-EU. 
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which this attractive way of life could be developed‟. If identity is understood as contingent, 
the initial decision to support integration, to maintain the status quo or to push for devolved 
powers, is seen to be taken in response to a more or less rational calculation concerning the 
costs and benefits of integration or devolution rather than being driven by some elusive sense 
of Europeanness. Loyalty to or identification with various territorial or other objects of 
attachment are not fixed but contingent upon the ability of the various authorities to deliver 
valued goods. 
This understanding of identity as contingent is consistent with contemporary 
manifestations of shifting loyalties in the component units of, for example, the United 
Kingdom - a long-standing union between England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
Margaret Thatcher‟s perceived attack on the welfare state in the UK, it has been argued for 
example, helped to foster support for Scottish nationalism: „Defence of the welfare state had 
priority and nationalism is contingent, hence many Scots in the 1980s argued that the best 
way of defending this great British institution was by destroying Britain‟ (Mitchell, 1996: 
54). To some extent, previously quiescent Scots, and even Scots who previously identified 
themselves as British, resurrected their Scottish identity in order to protect a valued good. 
What constitutes a more attractive way of life or a valued good is not a given. Thus, 
the context in which calculations and declarations are made regarding the level(s) of authority 
with which European people(s) identify and what this means to them plays a key role. When 
studying the process of what might, following Laitin (1998), be called „identity in formation‟, 
the various opportunities, constraints, internal and external challenges, or the context within 
which actors operate, must be understood.  
 
(ii) Function and Sentiment as Mutually Reinforcing Aspects of EU Identity: 
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Following recent developments in European integration and the challenge these have 
presented to existing theoretical approaches, Hooghe and Marks (2008: 23) have observed 
that there is more to the construction of the EU than simply economic bargaining. They argue 
that a post-functionalist theory of European integration is required, integral to which is the 
role played by identity. The issue of the nature of identity, and the relationship between 
identity and functional interests, has long been debated in the literatures on nationalism and 
national identity. It is argued here that a false dichotomy between „interest driven‟ and 
„identity driven‟ behaviours must be avoided. With respect to the relationship between 
identity and interests six key insights emerge from the literature on national identity and 
community formation: 
a. Identity has more functional or banal aspects than are suggested by many of the 
traditional measures, in terms of sliding scales of stated affiliations and declarations of how 
European or otherwise an individual feels. The affective dimension of identity refers to the 
„we‟ feeling or sense of belonging and to the sentimental attachment of an individual to a 
political unit. Many have focussed on the affective dimension of identity, on the importance 
of shared histories, values and language, of ethnic symbolism (Smith, 1995) or the „psychic 
income‟ (Kellas, 1991) associated with a shared identity. Others, however, have recognised 
the functional (Deutsch et al, 1957), even instrumental (Brass, 1979), elements implicit in the 
concept of identity. Thus, as Gellner (1964: 160) argues, „Men do not in general become 
nationalists from sentiment or sentimentality, atavistic or not, well-based or myth-founded: 
they become nationalists through genuine, objective, practical necessity, however obscurely 
recognised‟.   
Scholars utilising Deutsch‟s insights in an attempt to understand or measure the 
development of a European Union identity have emphasised his arguments concerning the 
importance of communicative systems for the emergence of a shared (in this case, European 
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Union) cultural identity (for example, Fligstein (2008: 16-17)). However, in relation to the 
process of integration, Deutsch et al (1957: 5)
 
stipulated only a very limited ability to 
communicate as a prerequisite. Indeed, drawing on extensive comparative research into the 
process of nation-building, Deutsch et al (1957: 90) specifically emphasised the importance 
not of shared values but of complementary interests: „The basis of such cooperation was not 
necessarily similarity of values or outlook, but rather complementarity – that is an 
interlocking relationship of mutual resources and needs’.7 This alignment was not reliant on 
shared language, character, memories or history or a shared sense of belonging (in this case a 
sense of Europeanness) but required simply „the ability to communicate more effectively, and 
over a wider range of subjects, with members of one large group than with outsiders‟ 
(Deutsch, 1953[1966]: 97). 
Others have argued further that even those nationalist affiliations traditionally 
associated with impassioned „hot‟ ethnically based nationalism can be understood to have an 
underlying functional basis. For example, Hardin‟s (1995: 5) rational interpretation of 
support for national movements argues that „self-interest can often successfully be matched 
with group interest‟. For Hardin (1995: 70) the identification of individuals with ethnic 
groups is not primordial or extra-rational. Individuals, identify with ethnic groups because „it 
is in their interest to do so‟. 
b. The functions performed, or valued goods provided, need not be economic in 
nature. Physical security was traditionally associated with the guarantees provided by a state 
to its community. Bloom, usiing identification theory, also stresses the importance of 
„psychological security‟ (Bloom, 1990: 61) and the importance of a sense of belonging to a 
„secure community‟ (Bloom, 1990: 152). The symbolic and political benefits for some of 
being seen to belong to an association of „modern‟ states and the instrumental benefits of 
                                                             
7 Emphasis added. 
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affiliation with the EU for the achievement of goals to which identity is of secondary 
importance are well known. 
c. The functional basis of identification need not be recognised by affiliates. The most 
readily available data on European Union identity, largely through Eurobarometer surveys, 
provides only a very limited starting point for the analysis of an EU identity. In particular, the 
problematic nature of the classic Eurobarometer question, „How often do you think of 
yourself as a – European, European and [nationality], nationality and [European], nationality‟ 
(see for example, Standard Eurobarometer 61, 2004) has been highlighted. Not only does the 
question fail to distinguish between an EU and a European identity but as Haesly (2004: 99) 
argues, „Making claims about how „European‟ certain (groups of) individuals are requires 
capturing the myriad ways the type and level of European attachments interact‟.8 Indeed, 
according to Bruter (2003: 1154), „when two individuals claim to „feel European‟, they might 
mean totally different things in terms of both the intensity of the feeling they describe and the 
imagined political community they refer to‟. However, even as data sources become more 
nuanced, individuals may not themselves always be aware of any rational basis which may 
underpin their affiliation: „A group gains power from coordination of its members, powers 
that may enable it to take action against other groups. Hence, the group may genuinely be 
instrumentally good for its members, who may tend, without foundation, to think it is 
inherently, not merely contingently, good‟ (Hardin, 1995: 70).  
                                                             
8 Although, for example, Green (2007) and Fligstein (2008) both highlight the growing number of individuals 
willing to identify themselves as „nationality and European‟, it is important, as Green points out, to distinguish 
between a broader European cultural identity and what, for example, Bruter (2005) called a European political 
identity. Identification by an individual as „European‟ might equally be made by a Swiss or Norwegian citizen. 
It thus remains difficult to discern the extent of any causal relationship between identification of an individual as 
a European and membership of the EU as a political unit. 
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d. That identity includes functional elements does not imply that sentiment is 
unimportant. The attachment, even the love, felt by an individual for their country or people, 
or the concept of national sentiment, is no less authentic for the recognition that identity 
incorporates a functional dimension.  Indeed, it is the ability to marshal support for the 
pursuit of various interests under the mobilising banner of nationalist sentiment, and the 
power of symbolic signifiers, which has made the study of national identity, its formation and 
its functions, so important and so intriguing. As Gellner argued, while seen by some as 
offensive and as under-estimating the depth of individuals‟ sentimental attachment to their 
nation or community, an approach which recognises the intrinsic role of functional interests 
implicit in the concept of identity is „derogatory only if you insist that your national, patriotic 
sentiment springs directly, unconditionally, from some innermost psychic springs untainted 
by the influence of the social environment‟ (Gellner, 1997: 11-12).  
 
(iii) The Importance of Symbolic Signifiers: 
The attachment of symbolic signifiers to functional benefits is central to 
understanding how identification with a political authority is generated. The interplay 
identified between interest and identity in the development and maintenance of political 
communities is consistent with, for example, Almond and Verba‟s (1963) analysis of the 
affective and evaluative dimensions of political engagement and their contribution to creation 
of the „civic culture‟. Central to the interplay between the affective and evaluative dimensions 
of identification with the political regime is the extent to which functional benefits, whether 
material or otherwise, become attached to meaningful symbols or signifiers of attachment to 
the relevant political unit such that these symbols resonate with the public and become 
capable of mobilising „national‟, or in this case, „EU‟ sentiment.  Deutsch ([1953]1966: 170) 
also argued that communications and symbols were central to an understanding of the 
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emergence of a „national consciousness‟. Individuals are not limited by pre-existing norms 
but are able to normalise new practices and to integrate new behaviours with past traditions 
by re-imagining or re-branding existing symbols. In this way, a  people „can achieve 
consciousness by attaching secondary symbols – that is symbols about symbols – to certain 
items in its current intake of outside information, and to certain items recalled from memory 
(Deutsch, [1953]1966:170). Billig (1990:175), referring to the nation state, argued that there 
was a need for a taxonomy of „flaggings‟. From an EU perspective, the extent to which 
citizens are exposed to different types of EU flaggings in different domains and in different 
member states could be measured. This is very much in tune with Deutsch‟s suggested 
mapping of communication patterns and how they are experienced by individuals. Deutsch 
also stressed the importance of mapping the extent to which secondary symbols, carrying 
implicit messages about nationhood, had become attached to these daily events and patterns 
of communication: 
 „How wide is the range of interests and the volume of communications and 
experiences among the members of a people? To what share of these have national 
symbols become attached? How often are those national symbols then found in 
circulation? What persons, things and institutions are devoted to producing these 
secondary symbols, and how important is that portion of the primary 
communications to which they have become attached?‟ (Deutsch, [1953]1966:172-
173). 
 Both identification with the EU and identification as a European might, over time, be 
accompanied by a sentimental attachment to the EU as symbolic signifiers become attached 
to valued functions, thus providing a shorthand connection between valued goods and 
sentimental association with the European Union as provider of those goods. A detailed 
mapping exercise is required to establish the extent to which EU symbols, from flags to more 
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mundane reminders, have become associated in the popular perception with valued public 
goods. 
 
(iv) Implicit Identification with the European Union: 
For many years a „heroic‟ understanding of identity was pervasive in the study of 
European Union identity, characterised by Smith‟s (1995:139) provocative question, „who 
will feel European in the depths of their being, and who will willingly sacrifice themselves 
for so abstract an ideal? In short, who will die for Europe?‟ To some extent this heroic 
understanding of European Union identity continues to inform the practical efforts of the EU 
institutions and elites. Attempts have been made to „bring Europe closer to the people‟ by 
manufacturing a European Union identity, creating flags to wave, anthems to unite and by 
seeking to engender a grand constitutional settlement for the European Union.
9
 Evaluations 
of top-down efforts to Europeanise identity have been unequivocal. Empirical studies have 
shown the socializing effects of European institutions to be uneven and weak, and for 
Checkel (2005:815) „in no way can be construed as shaping a new, post-national identity‟. 
However, the production and reproduction of European Union identity is much more 
extensive and much more mundane than these grand efforts and their critiques suggest. For 
Gellner (1997: 94), „[C]ultures are sometimes invisible to their bearers, who look through 
them like the air they breathe...‟. Also referring to the study of national identity, Billig (1995: 
44) decried the fact that the term „nationalism‟ is frequently reserved by scholars to refer to 
„outbreaks of “hot” nationalist passion, which arise in times of social disruption and which 
                                                             
9 The Constitutional Treaty was rejected in 2005 following referenda in France and the Netherlands and 
subsequently abandoned and replaced by the Lisbon Reform Treaty (also rejected by Ireland in its referendum in 
2008 and subsequently passed at the second attempt on 1 Oct 2009). The Lisbon Reform Treaty was ratified by 
the last member state, the Czech Republic, on November 3 2009. 
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are reflected in extreme social movements‟. As he argued: „All over the world, nations 
display their flags, day after day. Unlike the flags on the great days, these flags are largely 
unwaved, unsaluted, unnoticed‟ (Billig, 1995: 46). What is often neglected in the study of 
identity is the day to day, low-level, reinforcement of a shared consciousness, albeit passive, 
which is crucial to the maintenance of the regime. Coins, symbols, background flags, policy 
interventions and legal frameworks provide constant daily reinforcement, at an unconscious 
level, of EU membership.
10
 Even if few are prepared to die for the EU, membership of the 
European Union has become increasingly entrenched as part of everyday life in the European 
Union. 
Three closely related elements help to explain how the EU becomes normalised 
within the lives and imaginings of EU citizens: re-imagination, collective forgetting and 
normalisation: 
a. Re-imagination: The statement that the EU is an „imagined community‟ 
underestimates the degree of „deep, horizontal comradeship‟ implied by Anderson (1991: 6) 
in his reference to community and overestimates the existence, in any community, of a single 
imagining of what that community is and what membership of the community means.  There 
is no single imagining of the European Union and no single understanding of what it means 
for an individual to identify with the EU.
11
  Moreover, identity itself is not immutable but 
                                                             
10 It is worth noting that, in a daily low-level manner, such symbols may also present a constant source of 
annoyance. Nevertheless, they serve as a daily reminder of an emerging status quo ante which might cost more 
to challenge than to tolerate. Following the theoretical arguments developed here, banal Europeanism would 
incorporate low-level or banal Euro-scepticism which, unless mobilised, would also not threaten the daily 
functioning of the EU system. Should the extent of the implicit attachment to the EU become explicit , however, 
the individual might use this as a resource to re-assess their support for the EU.  I am grateful to participants at 
an earlier presentation at ARENA for helpful discussions in relation to this point. 
11 Indeed, the ability of the EU to accommodate a diverse range of imaginings of what the EU is and might be 
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adaptable and susceptible to change. What it means to an individual to be Scottish, Greek or 
European today may not be the same tomorrow. Likewise, for any given individual at any 
given time, both the meaning and utility of identifying as Scottish, Greek or European may 
not be the same as that for any other individual at that particular time. Individuals have an 
extraordinary ability to re-order or revise or to re-imagine their various identities and the 
communities with which they identify should it be in their interest to do so. As Bloom 
(1990:50) puts it, „As life circumstances change, individuals may make new and appropriate 
identifications. Individuals may also seek to protect and enhance identifications already 
made‟. Thus, the relative costs and benefits or appropriateness of being Scottish, Greek, or 
European may also alter over time. Facilitating the re-imagination of the European Union and 
the twin adaptabilities, of both the meaning and the utility of identification with the European 
Union, is the inculcation of new norms in the daily lives of individuals such that previous 
practices and perceptions are, at least temporarily, blocked from the collective memory. 
b. Collective Forgetting: Part of the raison d’être of the EU was to create lasting 
habits of peaceful co-operation between previously antagonistic and warring nations and to 
tie Germany irrevocably into a Union with its European neighbours. In many respects, the 
collective forgetting of these relatively recent past antagonisms has been highly successful. 
The normalisation of the membership of former Eastern bloc states within the EU framework 
is testament to the relative speed with which collective forgetting can take place. The insights 
offered by Ernest Renan in 1882, in relation to the nation state, thus remain relevant to the 
study of the European Union today. Renan (1990:11) emphasised the importance of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
provides, at the very least, a safety valve which allows for a coexistence of diverse perspectives and the 
avoidance of entrenched conflict over the future of the EU and thus facilitates the process of integration.  Even 
further, the diverse imaginings, rather than simply co-existing, may provide an important dynamic for the 
integration process (see Cram 2009b). 
17 
 
collective forgetting of inconvenient pasts for the maintenance of contemporary national 
identities. In similar vein, Billig (1995: 38) argued that „the nation which celebrates its 
antiquity, forgets its historical recency‟.  While Deutsch (1953[1966], 117) discussed the 
process of social learning through which shifts in identification might be reinforced and 
earlier preferences revised: „And as with all learning processes, they need not merely use this 
new information for the guidance of their behaviour in the light of the preferences, memories 
and goals which they have had thus far, but they may also use them to learn, that is, to 
modify this very inner structure of their preferences, goals and patterns of behaviour‟. To 
some extent, collective forgetting, which serves mutual interests, takes place through the 
normalisation or domestication of previously unfamiliar practices. Thus, as patterns of 
behaviour shift, what at first appeared new gradually becomes unremarkable. 
c. Normalisation: The learning of „integrative habits‟ as a result of prior cooperation 
was viewed by Mitrany (1943), Deutsch (1953[1966]), 153, et al 1957) and Haas (1958) to be 
a vital aspect of regional integration. The learned habits of integration are central to the 
normalisation, at an unconscious level, of the EU in the lives of its citizens. These routines 
and habits by acting as daily reminders of belonging may, in Billig‟s (1995: 43) terms, „serve 
to turn background space into homeland space‟. Normalisation of the EU occurs as new rules 
and routines or integrative habits transform understandings of the place of the EU within the 
lives and imaginings of its citizens into a state of normality such that a re-imagination of the 
EU and of the meaning and utility of membership of the EU becomes possible and a 
collective forgetting that life was ever otherwise takes place.  
For EU citizens identification is largely based on daily low-level engagement with the 
EU in unremarkable ways (carrying passports or driving licences, conforming with 
legislation, walking past EU flags) which nevertheless remind citizens of their involvement in 
the larger EU system whether for good or ill (Cram, 2001). Attempts to operationalise the 
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concept of banal Europeanism have found that, throughout the EU, there has been a rise in 
low-level 'banal' references to Europe or European actors, institutions and law in the media 
which are quite distinct from the more explicit debates engaged in by elites over whether 
particular European developments promote or undermine the national interest (Trenz, 2004, 
2006). To this extent, reference to the EU increasingly becomes normalised – a description of 
„home‟ events rather than foreign news. Even the very term member state could be viewed as 
an unwaved flag, an unremarkable but constant reminder of membership/belonging to the 
European Union. The implications of the embedding of banal Europeanism may be far 
reaching for European integration. In a low-level manner, at the unconscious level, the EU 
increasingly impinges directly „upon the actual experience of the individual‟ - a factor which 
Bloom (1990: 59) identifies as a key aspect of the process of nation building. 
 
4. From Implicit to Explicit Identification with the EU: The Emergence of 
the EU as a Meaningful Presence 
(i) The EU as a Meaningful Presence 
The willingness of its citizens to shift allegiances to the EU level is not essential to the 
continued functioning of the EU.  However, such willingness may occur if the EU becomes a 
positive meaningful presence, perceived to offer a better way of life for its citizens, and 
particularly if this preferred way of life is perceived to be under threat. By the same token, if 
the EU was to emerge as a negative meaningful presence, the understanding of identity as 
contingent which has been presented here, would predict that any existing allegiance with the 
EU might equally be withdrawn. Central to this argument is an understanding of the mutually 
reinforcing nature of function and sentiment implicit in the concept of identity:  
[Nationalism] never grows only as a response to cultivation from above, 
because certain elites believe that people ought to see themselves as „so-and-
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so‟s‟ (rather than whatever they thought they were before). The growth occurs 
when real socio-economic forces erupt into people‟s lives and show them the 
concrete meaning of identifying as „so-and-so‟s‟ – when they begin to see, or 
think they see, there is something in the ideology for their own life-prospects. 
(Nairn, 1977: 32)  
To appreciate functional benefits, individuals must experience those benefits and for 
identification to occur they must relate those experiences and benefits to the level of authority 
concerned. For a mass of individuals to identify explicitly with a state, they must first 
„actually experience the state‟ and that experience must be such as to „evoke identification‟ 
(Bloom: 1990: 61). Central to this experience, Bloom argued, was the concept of 
psychological security. This required either that „symbols of the state present an appropriate 
attitude in situations of perceived threat‟ or that „symbols of the state behave beneficently 
towards the individual‟ (Ibid.: 61). 
Deutsch et al (1957:85) referred to the „double process of habit-breaking‟: the process 
through which citizens, exposed to the benefits available from a new level of government, 
start to break the habit of allegiance to the existing political unit. The extent of the emerging 
habit of attachment to the alternative political unit become is revealed when the new benefits 
come under threat. This challenges the value of the current allegiance. The EU has 
traditionally been an elite-driven process, with restricted areas of jurisdiction, in which a 
significant disconnection persists between the actions of the EU and the experiences of its 
citizens. Even in cases where EU actions have direct and significant effects on the lives and 
experiences of citizens, these have largely been filtered by national executives and other 
interested parties such that it has been difficult for individual citizens to make reasoned 
calculations as to their status as winners or losers in the EU context (McLaren 2006:189). 
However, explicit support for European integration and even an explicit European identity 
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may be mobilised if an appreciation of the extent of the already existing banal Europeanism 
emerges and if the costs associated with any challenge to this emergent status quo are 
perceived to be unacceptable.  For some, revelation of the extent of their implicit attachment 
to the EU will not incline them to identify explicitly with the EU and not all individuals will 
value the same interventions in the same way. For others, the EU will become a negative 
meaningful presence. However, recognition of the extent to which implicit identification with 
the EU is emerging as the status quo nevertheless impacts upon calculations concerning the 
utility of opposing EU membership or seeking to withdraw from the Union and thus has 
important implications for the process of European integration. 
There is now extensive evidence of how the EU impacts upon the daily lives of its 
citizens (see for example, Wiener 1998, Maas 2007). As the range of EU activities spreads 
into previously forbidden territory of, for example, welfare provision, it is conceivable that 
the EU might emerge as a positive meaningful presence: a body consciously perceived to be 
bringing valued benefits to citizens.  In relation to, for example, EU wide access to health-
care, it has been argued that „Community law is a supranational source of individual rights, 
which through the empowerment of European patients augments enforceable and material 
meaning to the skeleton of European citizenship‟ (Martinsen 2005: 1052). At the same time 
as individuals are becoming aware of and actively pursue access to those benefits, national 
executives seek to maintain control over not only their budgets and planning priorities but 
over welfare, an area which has long been central to the relationship between state and 
society (Hervey and Trubek 2007:634). It is precisely this type of clash that that is most 
likely to result in the mobilisation of the latent political community in favour of European 
integration: as awareness emerges of the existing and potential benefits of EU membership 
and citizens, able to access their rights directly under EU law, face a threat by national 
providers to limit these emerging rights. If the ability of national executives to provide the 
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valued goods also comes into question, the conditions are in place for the development of a 
more explicit or conscious identification with the EU.  
 
(ii) The Role of Identity Entrepreneurs:  
The process through which the EU becomes a meaningful presence continues to be 
mediated, of course, by a wide range of identity entrepreneurs. Hooghe and Marks (2008) 
have argued that political parties at the domestic level play an important role in such political 
cueing and Laffan (2004) has argued that the EU institutions play a role as „identity builders‟. 
The role of the EU and its institutions in providing incentives for collaboration and in 
creating an „appreciative system‟ which values these incentives should also be taken into 
account. The concept of an appreciative system helps to explain the interrelationship between 
calculations of cost and benefits and the values or appreciation placed on those benefits. In 
the 1960s, Vickers (1965: 67), argued that cognitive frameworks, often implicit or 
unconscious, shaped the extent to which one course of action rather than another might be 
perceived as more desirable or acceptable to an individual. He argued, moreover, that such 
cognitive elements developed over time and in the context of a process of collaboration and 
interaction with a variety of actors. The potential synergies between different conceptions of 
the EU have important implications for European integration. By encouraging the confluence 
of disparate, but complementary, interests and imaginings, identity entrepreneurs can have a 
profound effect on the emerging sense of community in the European Union. 
The process of identification with the national state was not always, or even 
predominantly, spontaneous and nor was it inevitable – key actors and interests played a 
central role in fostering nationalist discourse. There is a powerful argument from scholars of 
nationalism that states generally precede nations (Keating, 1988), that national states 
frequently emerge from multiple centres (Breuilly, 1982), that nationalism does not simply 
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emerge but is actively created: „Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-
consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist‟ (Gellner, 1964: 169) and that 
„nations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way around‟ (Hobsbawm: 1990, 
10). 
Nationalism is a potent mobilising force and has been a powerful tool for those who 
have wielded it. Deutsch (1953: 188) referred to the „deliberate pioneers and leaders of 
national awakening‟ who saw the mobilisation of national identity and the creation of 
national symbols as serving their interests. Brass (1979:40) too argued that the study of 
ethnicity and nationality are best viewed as „the study of politically induced cultural change‟ 
and emphasised the role of political elites in inducing that change. Schmitter (forthcoming), 
in his tribute to Puhle, stresses similarly the role of „"ethnic/national entrepreneurs" who 
must interpret, not just the structural, but also the conjunctural situation in order to identify 
potential threats and opportunities‟.12  
The first organizers according to Deutsch (1953: 188) follow the pioneers and 
promote the beginnings of the transmission and institutionalisation of national identity. Brass 
(1991) stressed the importance of political organisation and structures for the transmission of 
national identity. Over the centuries various means of transmission and entrenchment of 
national sentiment have been pursued including physical force, the media, universal 
institutions, high culture and persuasion.  As well as military service and improved 
communication systems, Weber (1977),
 
for example, cites the power of education in turning 
„peasants into Frenchmen‟, while Anderson (1991: 201) reminds us: „A vast pedagogical 
industry works ceaselessly to oblige young Americans to remember/forget the hostilities of 
1861-65 as a great “civil” war between “brothers” rather than between – as they briefly were 
– two sovereign nation-states‟. 
                                                             
12 Emphasis in original. 
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A range of institutions (executives, bureaucracies, parliaments, courts) and actors 
(corporate interests, trade unions, social movements) operating at a variety of levels (global, 
transnational, EU, national, sub-national) each seek to embed or to protect their conception of 
the European Union in the institutional structures and practices which constitute European 
integration and thus promote or preserve their own interests. As long as national governments 
continue to be seen as the legitimate providers of valued goods or are not perceived to be 
blocking valued goods provided by the EU, the preference of citizens currently identifying 
with their national state is likely to be for the status quo requiring no adjustment to their 
existing affiliations. When, however, EU provision of valued goods becomes visible and 
attractive to citizens, but particularly when provision of those valued goods is threatened by 
national executives, and the legitimacy of the role played by national executives comes into 
question, then the EU becomes a positive meaningful presence in the lives of the European 
peoples. Then conditions are ripe for the mobilisation of the latent political community of the 
EU in support of European integration, or even for a shift in allegiances, as individuals begin 
to re-imagine the role and function of the EU as well as the meaning and utility of their 
existing and potential identities. 
 
Conclusion: 
This article built on the perspective of banal Europeanism which views identification 
with the European Union as underpinned by a process which is banal, contingent and 
contextual. The case of the European Union highlighted important issues in relation to the 
distinction between identification as a European, identification with the European Union and 
support for the EU or for further European integration. The importance of implicit as well as 
explicit identification with the EU in securing consent to the continued functioning of the EU 
even in the absence of support for European integration was also highlighted. Implicit or 
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unconscious identification with, or attachment to, the EU, is essential to the continued 
functioning of the Union. This is manifested in an, often unconscious, normalisation of the 
EU as a legitimate political authority such that to challenge this norm is to challenge the 
status quo. Conscious or explicit identification with the EU may also emerge in the latent 
political community as the EU becomes a meaningful presence for its citizens. The following 
arguments were presented concerning the nature of the relationships between identification 
with the EU, identification as Europeans and support for the EU or further integration: 
1. explicit identification as a European, and measures of support for the EU, are 
less reliable predictors of European integration than the extent to which a degree of 
identification with the EU, whether implicit or explicit, exists; 
2. implicit identification with the EU, is more widespread than measures of either 
support for the EU or identification as Europeans would suggest; 
3. implicit identification with the EU, may co-exist with a degree of Euro-
scepticism; 
4. as identification with the EU becomes more explicit this may increase support 
for the EU but not necessarily identification as Europeans; 
5. explicit identification with the EU is most likely to emerge when (or if) the EU 
becomes a positive meaningful presence in the daily lives of its citizens and, in particular, 
when hitherto unrecognised benefits from the integration process come under threat; 
6. the extent to which explicit identification with the EU results in support for the 
EU or European integration is contingent upon the actions, and perceived legitimacy, of any 
alternative providers of such valued goods (for example) at the national level. 
In answer to the question „do nations need navels?‟, Gellner (1997:36) concluded: 
„My own view is that some nations possess genuine ancient navels, some have navels 
invented for them by their own nationalist propaganda, and some are altogether navel-less‟. 
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This article asked „does the EU need a navel‟? The conclusion is that the EU does not need a 
navel, though it may develop one or have one invented for it. Tempting though navel-gazing 
is, analysts must ask what function such a navel might serve and for whom rather than simply 
going looking for one. 
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